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power” or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper 
we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO 
compensation of U.S. public companies that were ever in financial distress between 1992 
and 2005. Using a bias-corrected matching estimator that estimates the causal effects of 
financial distress, we find that, for the distressed firms, CEO turnover rates increase markedly 
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There is a debate on whether executive pay reﬂects rent extraction due to “managerial power” or is
the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we oﬀer a test of
the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public
companies that were ever in ﬁnancial distress between 1992 and 2005. We use a bias-corrected
matching estimator proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2007) to ﬁnd suitable control ﬁrms and
to estimate the causal eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation and opportunistic timing
of option grants.
Executive pay in U.S. public companies has been rising sharply since the 1990s, and the trend
has continued and persisted throughout the period of market crashes of the early 2000s and up to
the beginning of the current ﬁnancial/credit crisis.1 A prevalent form of compensation is equity-
related incentive pay such as stock grants and stock option grants. The principal-agent model
posits that the equity-based compensation aligns managerial interests with shareholder interests
and serves as a (partial) remedy to agency problems.2 An opposite but increasingly popular view
is that the level of executive compensation is excessive and a large portion of what top managers
get is not incentive pay but rents extracted by powerful CEOs from dysfunctional boards (see,
e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004). The lavish pay to top
executives of US ﬁrms, particularly to CEOs of those ﬁrms near or in bankruptcy, has repeatedly
caused outcry from the public. In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission passed
new rules in 2006 requiring companies to more fully and clearly disclose what they are paying to
top executives and the total compensation ﬁgure. In a similar spirit, the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 directs the Treasury to request ﬁrms participating in the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP) to “meet appropriate standards for executive compensation and corporate
1For example, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) document that, from 1999 to 2003, the ﬁve top persons at each
of the 1500 largest publicly traded companies in the U.S. cumulatively received $122 billion in salary, bonus and
stock, compared with $68 billion from 1993 to 1997. Moreover, in the 2001-2003 period, top-executive compensation
amounted to 9.8% of the companies’ net income, almost double from the 5% for the 1993-1995 period. A Wall Street
Journal analysis, dated on October 31, 2008, shows that ﬁnancial giants getting federal cash owe over $40 billion to
executives for past years’ pay and pensions as of the end of 2007.
2In empirical studies, Jensen and Murphy (1990) claim that observed contracts are fairly insensitive to changes in
shareholders wealth; Hall and Liebman (1998) report a much higher pay-performance sensitivity in more recent years.
With calibration exercises, both Haubrich (1994) and Aseﬀ and Santos (2005) report that observed pay schedules
can be generated by the principal-agent model.
1governance” (GPO, 2008, pp. 12).3
Our motivation for focusing on CEO compensation in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms is as follows.
Under the managerial power critique the only eﬀective constraint on executive compensation is the
“outrage” constraint given by what compensation level shareholders are willing to tolerate. For
ﬁrms under ﬁnancial distress, agency costs are arguably dramatically reduced since sophisticated
investors consolidate ownership interests and assert signiﬁcant control over ﬁrms; and managerial
power, if any, is much weakened due to a greater degree of scrutiny from stakeholders such as
creditors and shareholders, as well as the bankruptcy court judge if Chapter 11 protection is sought.
Consequently, the “outrage” constraint should tighten and the CEO compensation practices should
change signiﬁcantly from being ﬁnancially solvent to ﬁnancially distressed, with companies seeking
to make the compensation package more sensitive to performance. Of course, one could argue
that compensation practices change due to other reasons after ﬁnancial distress (e.g. contract re-
optimization in a new business environment). However, any such argument, if true, should be also
able to explain the important reduction in opportunistic timing of option grants among distressed
ﬁrms which we discuss below.
We deﬁne as ﬁnancially distressed the ﬁrms that either ﬁle for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
or satisfy both of the following conditions: i) their Ohlson’s (1980) O-scores, a commonly used
measure of ﬁnancial health, are in the top quintile of the O-score distribution, and ii) their past
three-year cumulative stock returns are in the lowest quintile of the returns distribution, among all
publicly traded ﬁrms. The evolution of diﬀerent components of executive compensation of distressed
ﬁrms over a six-year period (from two years before to three years after ﬁnancial distress) is then
contrasted with that of comparable ﬁrms that did not suﬀer ﬁnancial distress. We use the Abadie
and Imbens’ (2006, 2007) bias-corrected matching estimator to accomplish this and estimate the
causal eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation.4 This matching method allows us to ﬁnd
3The Act deﬁnes those standards as a) “limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive oﬃcers
of a ﬁnancial institution to take unnecessary and excessive risks...”; b) “a provision for the recovery by the ﬁnancial
institution of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior executive oﬃcer based on statements of earnings,
gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate”; and c) “a prohibition on the ﬁnancial
institution making any golden parachute payment to its senior executive oﬃcer...” (GPO, 2008, pp. 13).
4The Abadie and Imbens’ (2006, 2007) estimator has several advantages over other matching estimators like
propensity score matching. It is simple to use, it implements a correction for potential biases generated by non-exact
matching on (mostly) continuous variables, and it has a well deﬁned asymptotic variance. In addition, this estimator
has desirable properties in cases like the one under our study — when the number of treated observations is small
relative to the number of control observations, estimating a propensity score model can be problematic.
2for our “treated” ﬁrms (i.e., the ﬁrms that become ﬁnancially distressed) appropriate “control”
ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms that are near-identical in a set of observable characteristics to the treated ﬁrms)
in a period prior to ﬁnancial distress during which the treated ﬁrms are ﬁnancially solvent. Using
this matching estimator, we ﬁnd that, for the treated, CEO turnover rates increase markedly
and their CEOs, both incumbents and successors, experience signiﬁcant reductions in total cash
compensation and total ﬂow compensation upon and after falling into ﬁnancial distress. The bulk
of the reduction in total compensation derives from the decline in the value of stock option grants
which is not explained by changes in stock volatility, stock price, or option maturity. Nor is the
reduction in the stock option grants value attributable to the method used to calculate the Black-
Scholes value.
We also examine the dynamics of managerial opportunistic timing of option grants before and
after ﬁnancial distress. We follow Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer’s (2006) approach to focus on
how grant prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month, and we deﬁne “lucky”
grants as the ones with grant prices below or at the lowest stock price of the grant month. We ﬁnd
that the proportions of lucky grants for the treated ﬁrms are higher before falling into ﬁnancial
distress and lower upon and after becoming distressed, while the proportions of lucky grants for the
controls remain stable throughout the same period. Given the well-known comparative statics that
the Black-Scholes value of a stock option decreases with respect to the option’s exercise price, we
argue that the pattern of decreases in lucky option grants for treated ﬁrms after ﬁnancial distress
is consistent with the pattern of declines in the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants for those
ﬁrms. Therefore, we interpret the above evidence as indicative of a decrease in managerial power
that is caused by the tightening of the “outrage” constraint due to the episode of ﬁnancial distress.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature on executive compensation. First,
there is a large and still growing literature on the linkage between CEO compensation and ﬁrm
performance (see, e.g., Murphy, 1999; Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003). Our paper contributes to
this literature by introducing a new method to construct the control group with which we isolate
ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks from overall market forces. Using the matching method proposed by Abadie
and Imbens (2006, 2007), we are able to choose at each point of time an appropriate control group
which is (statistically) identical to the treatment group (ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms) in observed
3characteristics before ﬁnancial distress but is never ﬁnancially distressed. This is key to properly
evaluating the counterfactual compensation policies of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms (i.e., what would
have been the companies’ compensation policies had they not been in ﬁnancial distress). This focus
on counterfactual outcomes, which is not commonly seen in the executive compensation literature,
renders our results readily interpreted as reﬂecting the causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on CEO
compensation practices.
A closely related study is the one by Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993), who examine executive
compensation in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms during the 1980s. A key diﬀerence between our study
and theirs is that Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) just analyze compensation policies of distressed
ﬁrms before and after ﬁnancial distress but do not construct a control group to characterize the
overall changes in compensation practices that occur during their analysis period; in contrast, we
do. Moreover, there have been signiﬁcant changes in the compensation practices of U.S. public
companies, shifting in focus away from bonus-based pay in the 1980s to equity-based pay as of
the early 1990s. Thus, our emphasis on the sample period starting in the early 1990s provides a
more up-to-date snapshot of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation and oﬀers an
out-of-sample robustness check of their earlier study.
Another related strand in the executive compensation literature is benchmarking or relative
performance evaluation; that is, indexing CEO pay to industry or market benchmarks (e.g.,
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Garvey
and Milbourn, 2006). In theory, the compensation policy as an incentive mechanism, if working
eﬀectively, should pay for good performance and penalize for bad performance. The majority of
CEO compensation studies tend to mix the ﬁnancially healthy and ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms as
well as pool good and bad years for the market. As a result, due to the predominantly strong
market years over the period starting from the early 1990s, the ﬁndings of such studies might
be heavily inﬂuenced by pay for good performance and overlook penalty for bad performance,
thereby leading to potentially biased inferences. For example, Garvey and Milbourn (2006) report
asymmetric benchmarking in compensation so that executives are rewarded for good luck but not
penalized for bad luck. Our study, by examining the executive compensation practices in the set
of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms and by comparing these ﬁrms to similar ﬁrms that are not ﬁnancially
4distressed, concentrates on the situations where ﬁrms clearly under-perform the market and thus,
one would expect that boards would ﬁnd benchmarking relatively easy to implement. We ﬁnd
clear evidence that new CEOs hired after ﬁnancial distress are paid signiﬁcantly less than their
predecessors or than CEOs of similar but non-distressed ﬁrms, even though the distressed ﬁrms with
the new leadership on average outperform (at least in terms of stock price increases) the comparable
non-distressed ﬁrms. Our ﬁnding, thus, makes it hard to argue that some sort of benchmarking
mechanism is used by the ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms in designing the pay packages of these newly
minted CEOs.
Our paper also relates to the burgeoning literature that studies managerial opportunistic
timing of option grants. For example, Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2006), and Narayanan and
Seyhun (2008) all ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ abnormal stock returns are negative before executive option
grants and positive afterward and attribute the stock return pattern to managerial backdating of
option grants. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) examine the ranking of a grant price in the
distribution of stock prices during the month of the grant and show that lucky grants, i.e., the
grants issued at or below the minimum observed stock price in the grant month, provide a useful
tool for studying such managerial behavior. Our paper adds to this literature with two ﬁndings.
First, we ﬁnd that the proportion of lucky grants decreases after ﬁnancial distress with respect to
both control ﬁrms and the pre-distress treated ﬁrms. Second, we ﬁnd evidence on the weakening
of such managerial behavior after the enacting of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, both for healthy
and ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, corroborating the ﬁnding of Heron and Lie (2006).
Finally, there is a large literature on the relation between CEO turnover and ﬁrm performance.
Examples, to name a few, include Weisbach (1988), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988),
Gilson (1989), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), LoPucki (2005), Jenter and Kanaan (2006),
and Kaplan and Minton (2006). These studies show that a ﬁrm’s performance, measured by stock
returns or accounting ratios, and with or without ﬁltering out industry or market performance,
plays a very important role in aﬀecting CEO turnover rates. Our study concentrates on the role
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc performance in aﬀecting CEO turnover by controlling for the industry and market
performance in the procedure of matching the treated with the controls.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the construction of the sample
5under study. Section 3 explains in details the econometric method and the empirical strategy
used in the study. Section 4 reports the empirical results on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on
CEO compensation. Section 5 examines the dynamics of managerial opportunistic timing of option
grants before and after ﬁnancial distress. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Sample Construction
Data for this study comes from several sources. We use executive compensation data from Standard
and Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp database spanning the period from 1992 to 2005. The database
reports annual compensation ﬂows as well as information related to changes in the value of stock
and stock option holdings for the ﬁve highest paid executives, including the CEO, for each ﬁrm
appearing in the S&P500 Index, S&P MidCap 400 Index, and the S&P SmallCap 600 Index. Firms’
annual accounting data comes from S&P’s Compustat database. We obtain stock return data from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock File. We take bankruptcy ﬁling
information from Professor Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD). Throughout
our empirical analysis, we measure all monetary terms in 2005 constant dollars, and we adjust
nominal stock returns by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to
obtain real returns.
2.1 Variables
Three sets of variables are key to this empirical study. The ﬁrst set is the measure of ﬁnancial
distress with which we classify ﬁrms into ﬁnancially distressed or healthy. The ﬁnancially distressed
ﬁrms in our sample consist of two (in some cases overlapping) groups. One group is formed by the
ﬁrms that have ﬁled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and are covered in the BRD. The other group of
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms are identiﬁed based on a combination of the past three-year cumulative
stock returns and Ohlson’s (1980) O-scores.5 Speciﬁcally, at each year-end and from the universe
5To calculate the past three-year cumulative stock returns, we require at least 18 months of valid data within the
three-year period. Ohlson’s (1980) O-score is a widely-used measure for a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial status, and it is obtained
from a probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy with a set of ﬁnancial ratios including the logarithm value of total
assets, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, the ratio of working capital to total assets, the ratio of current
liabilities to current assets, the ratio of net income to total assets, the ratio of funds from operation to total liabilities,
the growth rate in net income, the dummy for total liabilities exceeding total assets, and the dummy for negative
net income for the last two years. Typically, the higher is the value of the O-score, the more likely is the ﬁrm to go
bankrupt.
6of all Compustat ﬁrms having non-missing information for both the O-scores and the prior three-
year stock returns, we rank ﬁrms into percentiles based separately on their O-scores and three-year
cumulative returns; we exclude the ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms from the rankings. We then classify those
ﬁrms as ﬁnancially distressed if the following two conditions are satisﬁed simultaneously: their
O-scores are in the top quintile of the O-score distribution and their past three-year cumulative
returns are in the bottom quintile of the cumulative return distribution.6
The second set of key variables is comprised of the outcome variables, i.e., diﬀerent components
of executive compensation. We focus on the compensation packages of CEOs who arguably
make most of the major corporate decisions and exert the greatest inﬂuence on ﬁrms among
the ﬁrms’ senior executives. CEO compensation consists of several components. Total current
compensation (TCC) is the sum of salary and bonus. Total direct compensation 1 (TDC1) is
the sum of total current compensation, the value of restricted stock grants (RSTGRNT), the
Black-Scholes value of stock option grants (BLKV ), and others. The “others” item includes other
annual short-term compensation, payouts from long-term incentive plans, and all other long-term
compensation. Besides TDC1, we use TDC2 as another measure of the total ﬂow compensation
to a CEO within one ﬁscal year, which is the sum of TCC, RSTGRNT, value realized from
option exercises (EXER), and others. For equity-based compensation, we calculate two measures
of CEO ownership: the stock ownership excluding option grants (SHOWN), which is the total
number of stock shares (options excluded) held by a CEO scaled by the total number of ﬁrm shares
outstanding, and the stock ownership represented by option grants (OPGRNT), which is the total
number of stock shares represented by options granted to a CEO divided by the total number of
ﬁrm shares outstanding.
The third set of key variables consists of the covariates we use to directly match distressed ﬁrms
with control ﬁrms. To identify the impact of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation we resort to
the Abadie and Imbens’ (2006, 2007) matching estimator. (See Section 3 for a detailed discussion
about the estimator.) The matching covariates include O-score, past three-year cumulative stock
return, ﬁrm size measured by the log value of market capitalization, leverage measured by debt-to-
6We also identify ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms with alternative combinations of those percentile cutoﬀs such as
the top decile on O-scores and the bottom decile on cumulative stock returns; the results under those alternative
classiﬁcations are qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
7asset ratio, one O-score-based dummy, one cumulative-return-based dummy, one size-based dummy,
industry, ﬁscal year, total current compensation, and total direct compensation. All the covariates
are deﬁned in the base year, that is, three years prior to the episode of ﬁnancial distress. We use
raw values of the O-score, the past three-year cumulative stock return, and ﬁrm size as measures
of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health. To better characterize our criteria of classifying ﬁrms into distressed
and solvent, we also include dummies based on the three raw measures: the O-score-based dummy
that is equal to one if a ﬁrms’s O-score is at or above the top quintile of all ﬁrms in Compustat and
zero otherwise; the cumulative-return-based dummy that is equal to one if a ﬁrms’s past three-year
cumulative return is at or below the bottom quintile of all ﬁrms in Compustat and zero otherwise;
and the size-based dummy that is equal to one if a ﬁrm’s market capitalization is at or above the
top 70 percentile of all ﬁrms in Compustat and zero otherwise. Moreover, it is well documented in
the literature that leverage, industry and year are also important determinants of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
status. We adopt Fama and French’s 5-industry deﬁnition based on the 4-digit SIC code and create
ﬁve industry dummies on which we also match. We use ﬁscal year dummies to characterize the year
eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial health. Finally, because we try to identify through matching the control
ﬁrms that are similar to the treated ﬁrms in as many aspects as possible, we also match on the level
and structure of CEO compensation packages; we thus include both total current compensation
(TCC) and total direct compensation (TDC1) as matching covariates.
2.2 Sample construction
Due to the data coverage of ExecuComp, our sample starts in 1992 and we include all compensation
information up to 2005. Moreover, because we are interested in the evolution of CEO compensation
practices over time, we choose an analysis window of two years before distress through three years
after distress, a total of six years. Including the two pre-distress years allows us to capture the
case where timing might be oﬀ if our deﬁnition of ﬁnancial distress does not identify the timing of
distress perfectly. Accordingly, we match the treated group to similar ﬁrms based on the matching
covariates in the year immediately prior to the analysis window, i.e, three years before a ﬁrm
becomes ﬁnancially distressed. As a result, we focus our analysis on the ﬁrms that we identify
as ﬁnancially distressed between 1995 and 2002, and we drop the ﬁrms that were ever distressed
before 1995 or after 2002.
8The treatment in our study is deﬁned as the “event” that a ﬁrm falls into ﬁnancial distress. We
use the term ﬁnancial distress broadly to include both bankruptcies and our measure of ﬁnancial
distress as described above. Most ﬁrms are in either of those two groups, but some would qualify as
ﬁnancially distressed under both deﬁnitions. Because a ﬁrm can become ﬁnancially distressed more
than once over time, we restrict the treatment to be the ﬁrst time that a ﬁrm becomes ﬁnancially
distressed (by either deﬁnition). In only a few cases we include a second spell in distress for the
same ﬁrm, if at least seven years have passed since the end of the ﬁrst distress spell. In order to
maintain a clean potential pool of controls for the treated group, we drop from the pool of potential
controls any solvent ﬁrm which has ever been ﬁnancially distressed before.
Further, we apply the following two criteria to select ﬁrms into our analysis sample: 1) Firms
do not have missing information for either the matching covariates or compensation variables in the
matching year(i.e, three years before the treatment); and 2) ﬁrms have at most one missing variable
in all compensation variables in the pre-treatment window (i.e., from two years before treatment
to the treatment year) and at most one missing variable in all compensation variables in the post-
treatment window (i.e., from one year after the treatment to three years after the treatment). As
a result, our analysis sample contains 99 ﬁrms that were ever in ﬁnancial distress and 1,205 ﬁrms
that have never been in ﬁnancial distress during the 1995-2002 period.7
Table 1 breaks down the distribution of the treated group and the pool of potential controls
of the analysis sample across years.8 Note that each of the potential control ﬁrms is assigned to a
particular year, which is done to avoid introducing serial correlation issues in the estimation of the
standard errors of our matching estimators. We defer to Section 3.2 the detailed explanation of
how we determine the year for each potential control ﬁrm, after we present the matching estimator
in Section 3.1.
7Although we ﬁnd 43 ﬁrms that ﬁle for Chapter 11 protection (e.g. appear in the BRD) and also appear in
ExecuComp in the 1995-2002 period, only 10 of those ﬁrms have enough valid information to be included in our
analysis sample.
8For several of the compensation variables we observe outliers that could potentially aﬀect the results. We thus
drop from our analysis the observations with the lowest and highest values for every outcome variable and for the
treated and the controls separately. This is why the sample sizes of the treated and controls appear as being at
most 97 and 1,203 in Table 1. We apply the same “trimming” rule when calculating the matching estimators. Using
diﬀerent “trimming” rules, we obtain similar results which are available upon request.
92.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the average CEO turnover rates in various subperiods for the treated and potential
controls ﬁrms. For notational convenience, we refer to the year of the episode of ﬁnancial distress
as “time 0” and express all other years relative to time 0 throughout the paper. For example,
the window [−1,+1] corresponds to the subperiod from one year before to one year after ﬁnancial
distress. Table 2 shows that the average turnover rate is signiﬁcantly higher in the treated group
than in the potential controls. For example, in the [−1,+1] subperiod the average CEO turnover
rate is 52% for the treated group and 33% for the potential controls. The average CEO turnover
rates for the treated group increase to 63% and 69% for the two subperiods [−1,+2] and [−1,+3],
respectively. In contrast, the corresponding CEO turnover rate for the potential controls are 41%
and 48%, respectively. Clearly, for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, most of the CEO turnover occurs in
the year of distress (time 0) and in the following year (time +1).
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables over time for the treatment
and potential controls groups. (Similar descriptive statistics for subsamples, deﬁned by whether
ﬁrms experience CEO turnover or not, are available upon request.) A few interesting patterns
stand out. First, the level of the total ﬂow compensation TDC1 is mainly determined by the
Black-Scholes value of stock option grants BLKV , while the total current compensation TCC and
the value of restricted stock grants RSTGRNT account for a much smaller share of this total ﬂow
compensation. Second, both the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants and value realized from
options exercised vary widely over time; there are much smaller ﬂuctuations in bonus, the value
of restricted stock grants, and stock ownership through option grants; and the salary portion of
compensation is quite stable, consistent with the notion that it is more or less a ﬁxed pay. As
a result, we can infer that the time variations in TDC1 and, to some extent, TDC2 are mainly
caused by the time variations in BLKV and EXER, respectively.
We observe other interesting patterns by comparing the descriptive statistics of the treated
group with those of the potential controls. While BLKV of the treated group shows a generally
decreasing trend from the pre-treatment years to the post-treatment years, the potential controls
exhibit an opposite trend of increase over time; a similar pattern is followed by the compensation
measures TDC1, TDC2, and RSTGRNT. In addition, note that except for salary and stock
10ownership through option grants, each of the compensation components for the treated group is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the corresponding compensation components for the potential controls in
almost all of the post-treatment years.
3 Empirical Strategy
The main objective of this paper is to examine the impact of a ﬁrm falling into ﬁnancial distress
on the ﬁrm’s CEO compensation practices. We consider ﬁnancial distress as a treatment, and
following the terminology of the program evaluation literature, we construct a control group to
estimate the causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation. The basic intuition is that the
control group allows us to determine the counterfactual, i.e., what the compensation packages of the
distressed ﬁrms would have been if they had not suﬀered ﬁnancial distress. In a standard regression
framework, all the ﬁrms that did not suﬀer ﬁnancial distress would form the control group, but using
such a control group could lead to biased inference, as shown in the program evaluation literature.
Therefore, an appropriate way is to ﬁnd non-distressed ﬁrms that are statistically identical (or
at least as close as possible) to the treated ﬁrms in observable characteristics and compensation
policies before the episode of ﬁnancial distress and to select solely those ﬁrms as controls. Below
we explain the details of our approach.
3.1 Matching estimators
There are diﬀerent methods that can be used to implement our approach. In this paper we use
the Abadie and Imbens’ (2006, 2007, AI hereafter) matching estimators which match directly on
covariates (both continuous and discrete). These estimators have several advantages compared
to other common methods like propensity score matching. Not only are they simple to use, but
they also implement a correction for potential biases generated by non-exact matching on (mostly)
continuous variables and they have a well deﬁned asymptotic variance.9 Most importantly, they
are well suited and have desirable properties in a case like the one under study — when the
number of treated observations is small relative to the number of control observations, estimating
9Being able to analytically calculate the asymptotic variance saves computing time with respect to estimating it by
bootstrapping. Moreover, Abadie and Imbens (forthcoming) show that bootstrapping fails for matching estimators.
11a propensity score (i.e., probability of treatment) model with the usual logit or probit method can
generate undesirable results.
Following the usual notation in the program evaluation literature, let Yi(0) and Yi(1) denote
the potential outcomes of unit i under control and treatment status respectively, for i = 1,..,N.
For each unit i we observe the treatment received Ti for Ti ∈ {0,1} and the outcome for each
treatment, Yi = Yi(0) if Ti = 0 and Yi = Yi(1) if Ti = 1, as well as a vector of pre-treatment
variables or covariates Xi. There are N0 control units and N1 treated units, N = N0 +N1. We are
interested in estimating the Average Treatment Eﬀect for the Treated (ATT)
τt = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Ti = 1].
The main identifying assumption necessary to estimate the above ATT is known as
unconfoundedness or the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). It assumes that
(Yi(1),Yi(0)) ⊥ Ti|Xi. This implies that after controlling for observable characteristics the potential
outcomes are independent of the treatment status. Actually, following Abadie and Imbens (2006,
2007) only a weaker version of the CIA is needed for estimating the ATT by matching; we only
need Yi(0) ⊥ Ti|Xi, that is, Ti is independent of Yi(0) conditional on Xi.10 The intuition is that,
after we control for all potential confounders Xi we can assume that the treatment is as good as a
randomized treatment.
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2007) consider the case of matching with replacement, allowing each
unit to be used as a match more than once. This has the advantage of improving the average
match quality with respect to the case of matching without replacement, but implies that special
attention must be paid to the number of times a unit is used as a match. Following AI’s notation,
let jm(i) be the index of the m-th match to unit i (i.e. jm(i) is the m-th closest unit to unit i
in terms of the covariate values, measured by the Euclidean distance between the two vectors).
Let JM(i) = {ji(1),...,jM(i)} denote the set of indices for the ﬁrst M matches for unit i, and
let KM(i) denote the number of times unit i is used as a match if M matches are done per unit,
KM(i) = ΣN
l=11{i ∈ JM(l)}, where 1{·} is the indicator function. Now, for i = 1,...,N deﬁne the
10In addition to the CIA, we need to satisfy an overlap condition and other regularity conditions. See Abadie and
Imbens (2006, 2007) for details.
12imputed potential outcome under the control status as
ˆ Yi(0) =
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This is called the simple matching estimator. Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that this estimator
is not N1/2-consistent in general, because it includes a conditional bias term that may be of order
larger than N−1/2, unless the matching variables include at most one continuous variable. An
attractive property of this estimator is that the estimator for the asymptotic variance proposed by
AI does not rely on bootstrapping (contrary to other matching methods).
Abadie and Imbens (2007) also propose a bias-corrected matching estimator where the diﬀerence
within the matches is regression-adjusted for the diﬀerence in covariate values:
˜ Yi(0) =
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(Yj + ˆ µ0(Xi) − ˆ µ0(Xj) if Ti = 1.
where ˆ µ0 is a consistent estimator of µ0 = E[Y (t)|X = x]. The bias-corrected matching estimator








(Yi − ˜ Yi(0)).
Contrary to the simple matching estimator, Abadie and Imbens (2007) show that this bias-
corrected matching estimator is N1/2-consistent and asymptotically normal. In this paper we
estimate both the simple matching estimator and the bias-corrected matching estimator, and
13the latter is our preferred estimator. We carry out such estimations using the Stata command
“nnmatch” which is discussed in details in Abadie et al. (2004).
3.2 Issues in estimating the ATT of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation
One diﬃculty in estimating the ATT of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation is that we have
properly deﬁned the treated and control groups (ﬁrms that ever go into ﬁnancial distress in the
period versus ﬁrms that never do), but the timing of treatment (ﬁscal year in which the ﬁrm goes
into distress) is only properly deﬁned for the treated ﬁrms. This is relevant because the standard
practice in estimating treatment eﬀects is to deﬁne as time t=0 the time of the treatment and
express all variables (both outcomes and covariates) with respect to time 0. The matching should
be performed on covariates that are not aﬀected by the treatment (i.e. before t=0) and possibly
include pre-treatment outcomes, while outcomes are the values of the post-treatment variables of
interest.
In our case though, it is not properly deﬁned what t=0 means for non-distressed ﬁrms because
we observe most of the ﬁrms every year and in none of those years they go into ﬁnancial distress.
One solution to this problem would be to generate a dataset of “potential controls” in which any
ﬁrm with valid information is “recentered”at time t=0 every period and is potentially included
several times.11 For example, if ﬁrm XYZ appears in all the years from 1995 to 2002, then XYZ
would be included in the dataset eight times (once every year); and for each instance we could
center each particular ﬁscal year as time t=0. In this way XYZ would appear once in the dataset
where t=0 corresponds to the year 1995, t=-1 to 1994 and t=+1 to 1996; and appear at another
time where t=0 corresponds to the year 1996, t=-1 to 1995 and t=+1 to 1997; etc.
However, a problem with that solution is that it would incorrectly assume that each instance (in
diﬀerent years) of the ﬁrm XYZ is independent of each other. The matching method deals eﬀectively
with sampling with replacement within the same period but cannot deal with the potential serial
correlation introduced by the above exposed approach. To avoid that problem, we use each potential
control ﬁrm only once. This means that we use ﬁrm XYZ as a potential control by considering t=0,
11Because the matching estimator consists of selecting the best possible M matches (with replacement) per treated
ﬁrm, some of these ﬁrms may never be good enough matches to be actually used as controls in the matching estimator.
This is why we call these ﬁrms “potential controls”.
14say, either as 1995 or as 1996, but not both. One way to implement this restriction would be just
randomly selecting the year for which ﬁrms will be potential controls; such randomization avoids
the serial correlation problem but might not use the available information eﬃciently.
An alternative and much better way is to assign each of these non-distressed ﬁrms to the year
in which they could potentially be most useful. That is, we want to ﬁnd among all possible years
in which a non-distressed ﬁrm could be used as a control or the best match for a treated ﬁrm. To
implement this idea, we essentially apply our matching estimator twice. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst
round, for each year we take all the ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms in that particular year, match them
against all the non-distressed ﬁrms, and calculate the Euclidean distance between each treated ﬁrm
and each non-distressed ﬁrm. Then for each non-distressed ﬁrm, we rank these distances across all
possible years and pick out the treated ﬁrm with which the particular non-distressed ﬁrm has the
smallest distance. Thus, the year in which that particular ﬁrm went into distress becomes the best
possible year in which we can use the non-distressed ﬁrm as a control, across all possible years in
which it could have been used as a control. Repeating this procedure for each non-distressed ﬁrm
we essentially ﬁnd the year in which each non-distressed ﬁrm could potentially be the best possible
match of the treated, and we use each non-distressed ﬁrm as potential control in that year only.
This is how we assign the potential controls to diﬀerent years as presented in Table 1. Note that
even in this situation all these chosen non-distressed ﬁrms are still potential controls (i.e., some of
the non-distressed ﬁrms will never be used in the matching estimation). In the second round, given
that we have assigned each non-distressed ﬁrm to one and only one year, we pool together all the
years and use the matching estimator again to ﬁnd the best M matches for each treated ﬁrm in
each year. We set the number of matches to M = 4, which Abadie and Imbens’ (2007) simulation
analysis shows to minimize the root of the mean squared error.12
Also note that t=0 could potentially refer to diﬀerent calendar periods for the treated and the
controls in a matched pair. For example, a control ﬁrm in a “good” year for the overall market
could be matched with a treated ﬁrm which goes into distress in a “bad” year for the market. To
avoid this problem, we include the ﬁscal years of the treatment as matching covariates to force
that the comparisons of the treated ﬁrms and the control ﬁrms are done within the same calendar
12In our estimations we also tried alternative values of M, from one to four, and the results are similar and are
available upon request.
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A second issue of importance is that our criteria for identifying a ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrm
includes the cumulative stock returns over the past three years. It means that whenever we set
time t=0 for a treated ﬁrm, the determination of t=0 is actually based (partly) on the stock
performance not only in t=0, but also in t=-1 and t=-2. As explained in the previous section, this
potentially “contaminates” all the pre-treatment variables in t=-1 and t=-2; it may not satisfy the
CIA condition that outcomes are not aﬀected by the treatment because at least stock returns in
each of these two pre-treatment years are mechanically low for ﬁrms going into distress at t=0.
This can further aﬀect other variables including those related to CEO compensation. Therefore,
we perform the matching on covariates measured at t=-3, which should not be aﬀected by the
determination of the treatment status.
3.3 Assessment of matching quality
Before discussing empirical results we assess the quality of matching which is critical to the success of
identifying the treatment eﬀect. Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the matching covariates
for the treated and the (potential) controls before and after the matching.
The ﬁrst panel of the table shows the mean and standard deviation of the matching covariates
for the 99 treated ﬁrms, while the second panel shows the same information for the pool of
1,205 potential control ﬁrms. The third panel calculates the diﬀerence and standard error in each
matching covariate between the treated group and the potential controls. It appears that the two
sets of ﬁrms are quite diﬀerent in several matching covariates, particularly the year and industry
distribution, ﬁrm leverage, O-score and the past three-year cumulative stock return. Speciﬁcally,
relative to the pool of potential controls, 8% more of the treated ﬁrms are concentrated in the
ﬁscal year 1998 but 16% less of the treated ﬁrms are concentrated in the year 2001; 11% less of
the treated ﬁrms belong to the industry with SIC=2, but 12% more of the treated ﬁrms are in
the industry with SIC=3; the average O-scores of the treated ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly higher and 7%
more of the treated are in the top quintile of the O-score distribution. More problematically, the
average past three-year cumulative return of the treated ﬁrms exceeds that of the potential controls
by 24% and the gap is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
16The fourth panel of Table 4 shows the mean and standard error of the within-match diﬀerences
in the covariates between the treated ﬁrms and the actually used controls when we apply the
matching estimator. Analyzing the within-match diﬀerence allows us to evaluate the quality of the
matching and shows how the matching improves balancing of the covariates between the treated
and controls groups. Note that, because we match each treated ﬁrm with four controls (M = 4), the
number of observations represents the number of within-match diﬀerences used in the calculations
and, of course, equals the number of treated ﬁrms multiplied by four.
Clearly, once the matching procedure selects the best controls for the treated ﬁrms, the two
groups are much more similar to each other. The matching succeeds for all the dummy variables.
In particular, the year and industry classiﬁcations are now balanced. The balancing of covariates
is very good for the continuous variables too, although not perfect. The diﬀerence in the O-scores
between the two groups is cut in half, decreasing from 6% to 3%, but remains statistically signiﬁcant
after matching. The cumulative stock return shows the largest improvement, with the diﬀerence
between the treated and the actual controls dropping sharply from a signiﬁcant 24% gap to a
minimal and insigniﬁcant 4% gap. One exception is market capitalization in that the diﬀerence
in ﬁrm size between the treated ﬁrms and the controls becomes signiﬁcant after the matching.
However, the diﬀerence in ﬁrm size does decrease from 0.25 to 0.22 with the matching, but the
signiﬁcant reduction in the standard error of the diﬀerence, shrinking from 0.15 before the matching
to 0.08 after the matching explains the increase in statistical signiﬁcance. This suggests that ﬁrms
that go into ﬁnancial distress are in average smaller than ﬁrms that do not, and we have a hard
time ﬁnding ﬁrms of equivalent size as controls.
To sum up, the overall quality of the matching appears to be quite good and the matching works
well in balancing diﬀerences in observed characteristics between the ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms and
the comparable non-distressed ﬁrms. Note that we even match on the level and composition of
CEO compensation at t=-3, which implies that the treatment and control ﬁrms are similar not only
in their characteristics and ﬁnancial situations but also in their compensation policies. Below we
proceed to use the matching estimator to estimate the causal eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress on CEO
compensation.
174 The Eﬀects of Financial Distress on CEO Compensation
The outcomes of interest are the compensation components that are summarized in Table 3. For
each outcome variable we estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) eﬀect over the
period from two years before the ﬁrm goes into ﬁnancial distress (t=-2) up to three years after
(t=+3). There are two reasons to include the pre-treatment years in the window of analysis. On
one hand, the event year (t=0), in which the ﬁrm goes into ﬁnancial distress, is determined based
on our method as explained in Section 3, so one may question the precision of the timing. By
examining whether there is any treatment eﬀect before t=0, we also implicitly check whether the
timing of our treatment variable is correct or not. Second, and more importantly, estimating the
ATT on pre-treatment outcomes provides an indirect test on the feasibility of the Conditional
Independence Assumption (CIA). The CIA is not testable, but as ﬁrst noted in Heckman and
Hotz (1989), one can estimate the treatment eﬀect over a period during which there should be no
treatment eﬀect and test whether that estimated eﬀect is zero. If the hypothesis of zero treatment
eﬀect is rejected, then it is much harder to argue that the CIA holds. Therefore, for the sake of
our study, we should expect the ATT on the pre-treatment outcomes to be zero.
Another concern regarding the CIA is that there might exist unobserved heterogeneity that
diﬀers across the treated and the actual controls, even after matching. The matching method is
designed to deal with diﬀerences in observed covariates, but it is also possible to control for certain
types of unobserved heterogeneity. If the unobserved heterogeneity generates systematic diﬀerences
in CEO compensation and the heterogeneity is ﬁxed over time (say, the ﬁrm’s location, the type
of products the ﬁrm sells, the characteristics of the industry the ﬁrm belongs to, etc.), then we
can subtract from each outcome variable the value of the same variable in a pre-treatment base
year such that this invariant unobserved heterogeneity is removed. This diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
(DID) type of estimator is preferred to the level estimator because the DID method removes any
time-invariant heterogeneity not taken care of by the matching on observable characteristics.
4.1 Results for all treated ﬁrms
Table 5 presents the treatment eﬀects on CEO compensation for all the treated ﬁrms using the DID
method. (For brevity, we do not report the ATT eﬀects based on the level estimators and the results
18are available upon request.) Nine components of CEO compensation are considered, including cash
compensation (Salary, Bonus, and TCC which is the sum of both); stock-based compensation
(the Black-Scholes value of options granted, BLKV , and the value of restricted stock granted,
RSTGRNT); the total ﬂow compensation including the aforementioned components, TDC1; stock
compensation based on exercising previously granted options, EXER; another measure of the
total ﬂow compensation incorporating the value realized from options exercised, TDC2; and stock
ownership through option grants, OPGRNT, which is deﬁned as the log value of the ratio of the
number of shares represented by option grants to the ﬁrm’s total shares outstanding. We implement
the DID version of the matching estimator by setting t=-3 as the base period.
Panels A and B of Table 5 present the results from estimating a simple matching estimator
and a bias-corrected matching estimator, respectively, with robust standard errors reported in
parentheses. As expected, given the quality of the matching, the treatment eﬀects identiﬁed by
the simple matching estimators and the bias-corrected matching estimators do not diﬀer much
qualitatively. Still, because the bias-corrected estimator deals with biases caused by non-perfect
matching on covariates, we prefer the treatment eﬀects estimated by the bias-corrected matching
estimation and concentrate our analysis on those results (in any case the results from the simple
matching estimation are qualitatively the same).
The ﬁrst thing to notice in Table 5 is that the treatment eﬀects for the nine outcome variables
in the t=-2 period are virtually zero with the only exceptions being EXER and TDC2 (which is
driven by the diﬀerence in EXER). It shows that the compensation policies of the treated and
control groups are essentially the same up to two years before ﬁnancial distress, although CEOs of
soon-to-be distressed ﬁrms exercise more of their options owned. In the year before distress (i.e., t=-
1), we see that some components of CEO compensation, namely, Bonus, TCC, and RSTGRNT,
become signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the treated and control groups, which seems to indicate that
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress appear earlier than the episode of the distress. We expect these types
of results, in particular for t=-1, given that our criteria for determining the ﬁrst period of ﬁnancial
distress is somewhat arbitrary. Overall, the evidence that the majority of the CEO compensation
components are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the treated and the controls in the pre-treatment
years, together with the evidence on the quality of matching as presented in Table 4, suggest that
19we have done reasonably well in deﬁning the treatment status and the timing of ﬁnancial distress.13
Table 5 shows that the CEO’s total cash compensation, TCC, of the distressed ﬁrms decreases
after t=0 in the order of $400 thousands per year. This is a large eﬀect in percentage terms with
respect to the total cash compensation in either the pre-treatment years or the treatment year
(in the respective order of 30% to 45%, see Table 3). Notably, the change in TCC is explained
almost entirely by an increase in the gap in bonus between the treated and control ﬁrms after the
treatment year. Moreover, Table 5 clearly illustrates, relative to the cash compensation, a much
larger negative eﬀect on stock-based compensation, particularly the Black-Scholes value of option
grants, BLKV . The value of BLKV drops by $2.3 million immediately in the distress year (t=0),
and continues to decline by $5 million in the ﬁrst year after distress (t=+1), followed by a reduction
of $2.7 million in the second year after distress (t=+2) and a statistically insigniﬁcant decrease in
the third year after ﬁnancial distress (t=+3). The value of stock grants, RSTGRNT, declines
slightly in the treatment year and the post-treatment period, but the magnitude is much smaller
and the treatment eﬀect on RSTGRNT becomes trivial compared to the eﬀect on BLKV . As a
result, the eﬀect on the total ﬂow compensation to CEOs, TDC1, is overwhelmingly driven by the
eﬀect on BLKV . The value of TDC1 drops by $3.2 million immediately in the year of ﬁnancial
distress (t=0), and continues to decrease by $5.8 million in the ﬁrst year after distress (t=+1),
followed by a decline of $3.5 million in the second year after distress (t=+2) and a statistically
insigniﬁcant decline of $1.3 million in the third year after ﬁnancial distress (t=+3).
Table 5 also shows that the value realized from exercising options, EXER, decreases by about
$2 million per year after ﬁnancial distress. The treatment eﬀect on EXER is not surprising as the
stock prices of the distressed ﬁrms decline signiﬁcantly after falling into ﬁnancial distress, thereby
reducing the value of previously-granted stock options. Consequently, the treatment eﬀect on the
alternative measure of total ﬂow compensation to CEOs, TDC2, which is driven by the negative
treatment eﬀect on EXER, shows a similar pattern as EXER. Table 5 also evidences the impact
of ﬁnancial distress on the practices of option grants in that the stock ownership through stock
13The results bode well for the Conditional Independence Assumption. As mentioned before, the CIA is not
testable. But, if before the treatment we can show that the outcome variables are not statistically diﬀerent across
the treatment and control groups, it is at least easier to claim that it holds. Our results show that ﬁrms match
well in t=-3, including on compensation variables. And, even in t=-2, there are no important diﬀerences in CEO
compensation between the two groups (except for the ones generated by EXER).
20option grants increases in the post-treatment years. That is, the companies under ﬁnancial distress
appear to grant more options as CEO compensation in lieu of cash compensation, probably because
these ﬁrms lack cash/liquidity due to the distress.
In summary, the results show that ﬁnancial distress signiﬁcantly impacts the level and structure
of CEO compensation and that the most signiﬁcant eﬀect is on the Black-Scholes value of option
grants, BLKV . As a consequence of a decrease in BLKV for the treated ﬁrms and an increase in
BLKV for the control ﬁrms, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on stock-based compensation is large.
The time-series of BLKV for the treated ﬁrms exhibits a sharp jump in t=-1, followed by signiﬁcant
reductions in t=0 and onwards. It is reasonable to expect a decrease in BLKV at t=0, the year
in which the ﬁrm goes into ﬁnancial distress, because the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial distress is partly
driven by a lackluster performance of the ﬁrm’s stock price. For example, if the stock price suﬀers
a sudden decline midway through the treatment year due to the fall into distress, then one would
expect that the Black-Scholes value of stock options will decrease in the same year because the
Black-Scholes value is mechanically related to the stock price. However, the observed pattern of a
large increase in t=-1 and large decreases in years after t=0 is intriguing. We defer to Section 5
the detailed discussion and potential explanations for this pattern.
4.2 Eﬀects of Financial Distress on CEO turnover
Another outcome variable of interest in our study is CEO turnover. One way a ﬁrm deals with its
CEO who has not performed as desired by the board (and the shareholders) is to replace the CEO
with a new one. Two recent studies by Jenter and Kanaan (2006) and Kaplan and Minton (2006)
both show that CEO turnover rates have increased substantially in periods roughly similar to the
one we analyze. Jenter and Kanaan’s (2006) paper is particularly interesting for our purposes
because it explicitly studies the eﬀects of relative performance on the probability of CEO turnover.
They ﬁnd that, contrary to the ﬁndings of studies for earlier periods, CEOs are signiﬁcantly more
likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and market performance.
Our matching estimator shares the ﬂavor of relative performance evaluation as the estimator
matches and thus implicitly controls for the covariates characterizing industry and market
performance. Like Jenter and Kanaan (2006) and Kaplan and Minton (2006), we ﬁnd that ﬁrm
21performance has a very signiﬁcant impact on CEO turnover in our sample. Table 6 reports the
treatment eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on CEO turnover using the bias-corrected matching estimator
(matching on the same variables as in Table 4). In panel A, we group the years before and
after the time of ﬁnancial distress (t=0) in alternative “windows”. We ﬁnd that turnover rates
are signiﬁcantly higher for treated ﬁrms compared to control ﬁrms. For example, in the [-1,+1]
window, the CEO turnover rate is 20 percentage points higher for treated ﬁrms, which is a very
large eﬀect taking into account that the CEO turnover rate for the control ﬁrms is 33%; if we
extend the window by including t=+2 or t=+3, the CEO turnover rate further rises by 6 and 9
percentage points, respectively.
We also estimate the treatment eﬀects on the CEO turnover rate on a year-by-year basis and
report the results in Panel B. Like our results on compensation, there is no diﬀerential eﬀect on
CEO turnover in t=-1, t=-2 or t=0. The single most important eﬀect on CEO turnover appears to
occur in the year immediately after the treatment year (i.e., t=+1), when we observe a signiﬁcant
treatment eﬀect of 23 percentage points. That is, the CEO turnover rate of the distressed ﬁrms is
23 percentage points higher than the turnover rate of the non-distressed ﬁrms after the ﬁrms fall
into distress. The treatment eﬀect on CEO turnover continues into t=+2 (8%) and t=+3 (7%),
although in a comparatively smaller magnitude than in t=+1.
4.3 Eﬀects of Financial Distress on Compensation by CEO Turnover Status
Given the signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect on CEO turnover, a valid concern is that our documented
eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress on CEO compensation are driven or confounded by the eﬀects on CEO
turnover. To separate the two treatment eﬀects, we estimate the treatment eﬀects of ﬁnancial
distress on CEO compensation for two subsamples. The ﬁrst is comprised of all ﬁrms that experience
CEO turnover, and the second is comprised of ﬁrms that do not experience CEO turnover. We
apply the bias-corrected matching estimator to each of the two subsamples.
A caveat is in order. Given that the year t=+1 is the ﬁrst and the single most important
period with a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in CEO turnover rates between the treated and control ﬁrms,
we decide to consider in the turnover subsample those ﬁrms that replace their CEOs only in the
period [-1,+1]. This restriction implies that those ﬁrms do not replace their CEOs in the periods
22t=+2 and t=+3, which yields a clearer comparison of the treatment eﬀect to the subsample of
no CEO turnover. For the no CEO turnover subsample we select all ﬁrms that retain the same
(incumbent) CEOs over the entire [-3,+3] period.14
Table 7 presents the results for each of the two subsamples using the DID speciﬁcation of the
bias-corrected matching estimator. Panel A shows the treatment eﬀects on CEO compensation for
the no-turnover ﬁrms, which are very similar to the ones estimated for all the ﬁrms in Table 5.
The salary, bonus, and total cash compensation of incumbent CEOs are signiﬁcantly lower in
and after the distress year. It is clear that the most signiﬁcant and dominant eﬀect is on stock-
based compensation, particularly the Black-Scholes value of option grants. The Black-Scholes value
decreases by $1.6 million immediately in the treatment year, and continues to decline by $3 million
in the ﬁrst year after the treatment, followed by reductions of $2.5 million and $1.1 million in the
second and third year after the treatment. Like in the full sample, the treatment eﬀect on the total
ﬂow compensation to incumbent CEOs is again overwhelmingly driven by the treatment eﬀect on
the Black-Scholes value of option grants. Notice that BLKV refers to new stock options granted
every year, so these decreases are pretty impressive. On the other hand, ﬁrms under ﬁnancial
distress tend to grant their CEOs more stock options in the post-treatment years, as evidenced by
the small but statistically signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects on OPGRNT.
Table 7, Panel B reports the treatment eﬀects on CEO compensation for the ﬁrms that
experience CEO turnover in the period from -1 to +1. Again, the single most important eﬀect
of ﬁnancial distress on the new CEOs’ compensation is on the Black-Scholes value of option grants.
Relative to the control ﬁrms which also experience CEO turnover during the same window, the
Black-Scholes value of the treated ﬁrms decreases by $2.6 million in the ﬁrst year after the treatment,
and continues to decline by $1.7 million in the second year after the treatment, followed by a
reduction of $1.5 million in the third year after the treatment. Same as for all the distressed ﬁrms
or the distressed ﬁrms without CEO turnover, the treatment eﬀect on the total ﬂow compensation
to new CEOs overwhelmingly reﬂects the eﬀect on the Black-Scholes value of option grants.
Diﬀerent from the no-turnover subsample, though, ﬁnancial distress appears to have a much less
14For robustness, we try diﬀerent ways to form turnover versus no-turnover subsamples with diﬀerent windows,
like -2 to +2, -3 to +3, -1 to +2, etc, and ﬁt the same bias-corrected matching estimator to each subsample. The
results are similar and are available upon request.
23and oftentimes insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the new CEO’s salary, bonus and total cash compensation,
suggesting that the distressed ﬁrms award their replacement CEOs cash compensation at a level
comparable to the solvent ﬁrms which also replace their CEOs.
The results for the turnover and the non-turnover subsamples suggest that CEOs of distressed
ﬁrms, regardless of whether they are incumbents or successors, suﬀer large reductions in their
compensation after the ﬁrms fall into ﬁnancial distress and that this reduction derives mainly from
the drop in the value of their stock option grants. This is similar to the patterns we observed in
our analysis of the full sample. Consequently, we conclude that the dominant treatment eﬀect on
the stock-based compensation is not caused by the treatment eﬀect on CEO turnover.
Also, an interesting implication arises from the results for the treated ﬁrms that do experience
CEO turnover. In those ﬁrms, new CEOs are paid signiﬁcantly less, in terms of stock compensation,
compared both to their predecessors and to the CEOs of control ﬁrms. One might argue that paying
less to CEOs of poor-performing ﬁrms is consistent with the use of benchmarking, or relative
performance evaluation, by boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. However, it is
hard, a priori, to argue that new CEOs should be penalized for the poor performance related to
their predecessors’ tenure. Moreover, when we analyze one potential “benchmark”–the performance
of the ﬁrm’s stock prices after a new CEO takes over–we ﬁnd that the stock prices actually increase
by 8%, 21% and 25% more in periods t=+1, t=+2 and t=+3 respectively, compared to the stock
price changes for the control ﬁrms that have also replaced their CEOs in the [−1,+1] period. That
is, at least in terms of stock price changes, new CEOs of the treated ﬁrms seem to be performing
well relative to the benchmark, which makes it even harder to argue that ﬁnancially distressed
ﬁrms use benchmarking in setting CEO compensation.15
15An alternative explanation for the lower equity-based compensation for new CEOs of distressed ﬁrms, is that
they are just of “worse quality” than the new CEOs of non-distressed ﬁrms. It is not easy to ﬁnd good measures of
“quality”, and we analyze two characteristics that we believe could be good proxies. First, we look at the percentage
of new CEOs that have prior experience as CEOs (i.e., having appeared as CEO of another ﬁrm in the ExecuComp
dataset) or at least some prior executive experience (i.e., having appeared as one of the top ﬁve executives in another
ﬁrm in the ExecuComp dataset). Second, we study internal promotions, i.e. new CEOs that have appeared as
executives in the same ﬁrm before becoming CEOs. With either measure of quality, we do not observe any signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the treated and the potential control ﬁrms. All the results are available upon request.
245 Explaining the Decrease in Value of Stock Option Grants
We have documented above that the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants for the treated ﬁrms
shows a spike in the year before ﬁnancial distress and substantial declines in and after the year of
distress. This pattern of value changes is unlikely to be driven by changes in stock prices because
the market capitalization of distressed ﬁrms, which changes virtually one-to-one with stock prices,
exhibits little variation from year to year after t=0. Nor do we observe signiﬁcant reductions
in the number of shares of options granted to CEOs in each post-treatment year; in fact, we
ﬁnd evidence that the distressed ﬁrms appear to grant more stock options to their CEOs after
falling into distress. In addition, this pattern of value changes cannot be explained by changes in
other parameters aﬀecting the calculation of the Black-Scholes value: stock volatility and option
maturity do not experience signiﬁcant changes across the post-treatment years. Further, we follow
the methodology explained at the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) website to calibrate
the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants and ﬁnd that the change in the option grant value
cannot be attributed to the method used in the ExecuComp database. For brevity, the results
conﬁrming these assertions are not reported in the text and are available upon request.
Given the well-known comparative statics that the Black-Scholes value of a stock option
decreases with respect to the option’s exercise price, we turn to examining the dynamics of exercise
prices of option grants as one likely explanation for the patten of Black-Scholes value changes. In
particular, we suspect that the observed decreases in the Black-Scholes value for treated ﬁrms is
related to managerial behavior of opportunistic timing of option grants. Recent studies document
vast evidence of such behavior among U.S. ﬁrms.16 We conjecture that, relative to mangers of the
control ﬁrms, mangers of the distressed ﬁrms engage in opportunistic timing of option grants in a
greater or similar extent before the year of distress, and that managers (or the board of directors)
signiﬁcantly cut back or totally abandon engaging in such activity after the ﬁrm goes into distress,
as the “outrage” constraint placed by the ﬁrm’s various stake-holders tightens when and after a
ﬁrm falls into ﬁnancial distress.
16For example, Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2006), and Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) all ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ abnormal
stock returns are negative before executive option grants and positive afterward and attribute the stock return pattern
to managerial backdating of option grants; Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2006) examine the ranking of a grant date’s
price in the distribution of prices during the month of the grant and show that lucky grants provide a useful tool for
studying such managerial behavior.
255.1 Descriptive statistics of lucky grants
To test our conjecture, we follow Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer’s (2006) approach to measure
opportunistic timing of CEO option grants by “lucky” grants. That is, we study how grant prices
rank within the price distribution of the grant month before and after ﬁnancial distress. As done
in the literature, we focus on unscheduled grants of options to CEOs.17 We set the grant price, if
not available, to the close price of the underlying stock on the same grant day because the common
practice for option grants is to issue the options at-the-money. Moreover, Heron and Lie (2006)
report that the abnormal stock return pattern consistent with the managerial option backdating
behavior has been much weaker since the implementation of the regulations in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX). The SOX, which requires option grants to be reported within two business days of
granting, took eﬀect on August 29, 2002. To isolate the treatment eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress from
the eﬀect of the SOX regulation, we focus on the pre-SOX period.18
Like Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2006), we deﬁne the lucky grants as the ones whose grant
prices are below or at the lowest stock price within the grant month, and we calculate the proportion
of lucky grants in two ways: a raw measure, which is the number of lucky grants divided by the
number of observed prices within the grant month; and a “net” measure, which is the number of
lucky grants divided by the number of diﬀerent trading prices within the grant month. The net
measure takes into account the fact that the prices of a ﬁnancially distressed stock might be “stale”
in that there are few trades of such distressed stocks. For robustness, we also calculate the raw
measure and the net measure weighted by the size of each option grant. The results are similar
and available upon request.
Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics of the two measures of lucky grants for the treated and
the potential control ﬁrms. We ﬁrst analyze the statistics based on the raw measure as reported
in the left panel of Table 8. Several patterns are worth mentioning. First, the proportion of
lucky grants is higher for the distressed ﬁrms than for the control ﬁrms, in t=-3 and t=-2. The
17Focusing on unscheduled grants is the standard approach to studying managerial opportunistic timing behavior,
but this restriction might make the evidence presented in this section not perfectly compatible with the evidence
documented in Section 4. The Black-Scholes value of option grants reported in the ExecuComp database includes
both scheduled and unscheduled grants. Unfortunately, the data does not contain suﬃcient information to calculate
the Black-Scholes value for unscheduled grants only.
18We ﬁnd similar pattern of lucky grants if we do not exclude the post-SOX period from our sample. The results
are available upon request.
26proportions of lucky grants for the treated are respectively 15.1% and 19.0% in the two periods,
while the corresponding proportions for the controls are respectively 13.6% and 14.3%. Second,
the proportions of lucky grants for the controls are quite stable during the period from t=-1 to
t=+3, ﬂuctuating around the 12% level. This evidence is consistent with Bebchuk, Grinstein and
Peyer’s (2006) estimate of the percentage of lucky grants in their sample ﬁrms from 1996 to 2005.
Third, the proportion of lucky grants for the ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms drops noticeably starting
at t=-1.19 The proportions over the [−3,+3] window are respectively 15.1% in t=-3, 19% in t=-2,
9.2% in t=-1, 7.9% in t=0 (i.e., the treatment year), 9.4% in t=+1, 10.4% in t=+2, and 5.2% in
t=+3. Taken together, these patterns show clearly that the proportions of lucky grants are higher
for the treated than for the controls prior to ﬁnancial distress and are signiﬁcantly lower than for
the controls from one year prior to three years after ﬁnancial distress. If we take into account
the eﬀective trading of stocks and analyze the net measure of the proportion of lucky grants, the
above patterns become stronger. As shown in the right half panel of Table 8, the proportions of
lucky grants for the distressed ﬁrms exceed the proportions for the controls by at least 2 percentage
points in either t=-3 or t=-2, but the proportions for the treated are at least 2 percentage points
lower than the proportions for the controls starting from t=-1 and up to t=+3.
Table 8 also reports the descriptive statistics of the two measures for the treated and the controls
in the post-SOX period. Interestingly, the proportions of lucky grants for the controls in the post-
SOX period drop signiﬁcantly to 4.7% and 8.5% in raw measures (0.9% and 5.1% in net measures)
at t=+2 and t=+3, respectively. In contrast, the proportions for the controls in the pre-SOX
period are 11.3% and 12.4% in raw measures (7.1% and 8.2% in net measures) at t=+2 and t=+3,
respectively. This result suggests that the SOX regulations help curtail opportunistic managerial
behavior in timing option grants, consistent with the ﬁnding documented by Heron and Lie (2006).
Furthermore, the proportions of lucky grants for the ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms are still smaller
than the proportions for the controls after the distress episode in the pre-SOX period, but the gap
narrows in the post-SOX period.
19Note that, as explained in Footnote 17, the calculation of the Black-Scholes value of option grants includes both
scheduled and unscheduled grants, while the analysis of lucky grants is based only on unscheduled grants. This may
explain why the proportion of lucky grants starts decreasing in t=-1 and the Black-Scholes value of option grants
starts decreasing in t=0.
275.2 Treatment Eﬀects of Distress on the Proportion of Lucky Grants
In this subsection we consider the proportion of lucky grants as another outcome variable of interest.
Thus, we estimate the treatment eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on the proportion of lucky grants, using
the same set of matching covariates as we use above for the analysis of CEO compensation. Table 9
reports the results based on the matching estimators both in levels (Panel A) and in diﬀerences
(Panel B).
We ﬁrst look at the results for the in-level estimates (Panel A). Although many of the estimates
are not statistically diﬀerent from zero, the in-level results exhibit a pattern of changes in lucky
option grants similar to the one obtained from the descriptive statistics. Using either the raw
measure or the net measure, the estimated treatment eﬀect on the proportion of lucky grants is
positive in t=-2, suggesting that before distress, treated ﬁrms tend to award their CEOs more lucky
grants than the control ﬁrms. However, the treatment eﬀects become negative starting at t=-1 and
remain negative through t=+3, indicating that the treated ﬁrms signiﬁcantly cut back the lucky
grants to their CEOs. In particular, the in-level treatment eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for t=0 and t=+1: based on the raw measure, the estimate is -6.5% and signiﬁcant at the 10%
level in t=0, and it is -8.7% and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in t=+1; based on the net measure, the
estimates are -7.2% and -8.9% in t=0 and t=+1, respectively, and both are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. Although the level estimates of the treatment eﬀect for t=+2 or t=+3 are not statistically
signiﬁcant, the magnitudes of the level estimates are by no means small: the estimates are about
-4.5% using the raw measure and about -5.0% using the net measure.
In Table 9, panel B we present the results for the DID estimates, with the diﬀerence taken
relative to the proportion of lucky grants in t=-3. Unfortunately, the DID eﬀects are much more
imprecisely estimated, making them not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the DID point estimates
of the treatment eﬀect on the proportion of lucky grants display a similar pattern to the level
estimates obtained above.
In summary, both the summary statistics and the matching estimators show evidence that there
is a change in the behavior of awarding lucky grants to CEOs of ﬁrms under ﬁnancial distress before
and after falling into distress. The soon-to-be insolvent ﬁrms tend to award their CEOs more lucky
grants than comparable solvent ﬁrms two years prior to insolvency, but those ﬁrms signiﬁcantly
28scale down the lucky grants to their CEOs upon or after they become ﬁnancially distressed while
the comparable solvent ﬁrms maintain about the same level of lucky option grants.
The pattern of decreases in lucky option grants for the treated ﬁrms after ﬁnancial distress
is consistent with the pattern of declines in the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants as
documented in Section 4 for those ﬁrms. In view of the Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer’s (2006)
ﬁnding that the likelihood of lucky grants is positively associated with the CEO power to set their
own pay, we interpret our evidence as indicative of a decrease in managerial power caused by the
tightening of the “outrage” constraint as a result of falling into ﬁnancial distress. Moreover, this
change in the behavior of awarding lucky grants to CEOs by ﬁrms under ﬁnancial distress can also
explain why even new CEOs of the distressed ﬁrms see their stock-based compensation decrease
signiﬁcantly relative to either their ousted predecessors or CEOs of comparable but solvent ﬁrms.
6 Conclusion
We study the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress on the CEO compensation practices of U.S. public
companies between 1992 and 2005. We match ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms with control ﬁrms using
Abadie and Imbens’ (2006, 2007) non-parametric bias-corrected matching estimators. We ﬁnd that
the CEOs of distressed ﬁrms experience signiﬁcant reductions in both their cash compensation
and total ﬂow compensation relative to CEOs of control ﬁrms. Also, CEO turnover rates increase
markedly following ﬁnancial distress. Moreover, the signiﬁcant reductions in compensation among
the set of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms occurs for both new CEOs and incumbent CEOs. The bulk
of the reduction in total compensation comes from the decline in the Black-Scholes value of stock
option grants. The large drop in option grant values for CEOs of the distressed ﬁrms is not explained
by stock volatility, stock price, option maturity, or the method used to calculate the Black-Scholes
value.
We proceed to examine the dynamics of managerial opportunistic timing of option grants before
and after ﬁnancial distress. We follow Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer’s (2006) approach to focus on
how grant prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month, and we deﬁne lucky grants
as the ones with grant prices below or at the lowest stock price of the grant month. We ﬁnd that the
proportions of lucky grants for the treated ﬁrms are higher before falling into ﬁnancial distress and
29lower upon and after becoming distressed, compared to similar but non-distressed ﬁrms. That is,
the treated ﬁrms tend to award their CEOs more lucky grants prior to insolvency but signiﬁcantly
reduce the lucky grants to their CEOs upon or after insolvency, while the solvent ﬁrms maintain
about the same level of lucky option grants.
We argue that the pattern of decreases in lucky option grants for treated ﬁrms after ﬁnancial
distress is consistent with the pattern of declines in the Black-Scholes value of stock option grants
for those ﬁrms. We interpret our evidence as indicative of a decrease in managerial power caused
by the tightening of the “outrage” constraint due to the episode of ﬁnancial distress.
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32Table 1. Number of treated and potential control observations per fiscal year 
Fiscal











The analysis sample is formed by all the firms with no missing information in
the matching or compensation variables in period -3, and at most one 
missing variable among all compensation variables in periods -2 to 0 and 
at most one missing variable in all compensation variables in periods 1 to 3.
Table 2. CEO Turnover rates 
Turnover
in Period Treated Pot. Controls No Turnover Turnover No Turnover Turnover
[-1,+1] 52% 33% 47 51 812 391
[-1,+2] 63% 41% 36 61 711 490
[-1,+3] 69% 48% 29 65 559 514
[-2,+2] 66% 47% 33 64 636 557
[-2,+3] 69% 53% 29 65 496 570
[-3,+3] 69% 56% 29 65 467 599
Note:  The sum of the number of observations in the no turnover and turnover groups does not add-up to the 
          total number of observations because for some firms turnover information is missing in some years.
Pot. Controls (# Obs.)
Analysis sample
Turnover Rate Treated (# Obs.)Table 3. Descriptive statistics for outcome variables
Variable Period
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
-3 0.5 0.3 97 0.6 0.3 1,203
-2 0.6 0.3 97 0.7 0.3 1,195
Salary -1 0.6 0.3 97 0.7 0.3 1,203
($ millions) 0 0.6 0.4 97 0.7 0.4 1,201
+1 0.5 0.3 96 0.7 0.4 1,202
+2 0.6 0.3 96 0.7 0.4 1,201
+3 0.6 0.3 94 0.8 0.4 1,075
-3 0.4 0.5 97 0.5 0.5 1,203
-2 0.4 0.6 97 0.6 0.9 1,195
Bonus -1 0.2 0.6 97 0.6 0.8 1,203
($ millions) 0 0.1 0.3 97 0.6 0.9 1,201
+1 0.3 0.5 96 0.7 1.0 1,202
+2 0.4 0.5 96 0.8 1.1 1,201
+3 0.5 0.6 94 0.9 1.1 1,075
-3 0.9 0.7 97 1.1 0.8 1,203
TCC = Total Current -2 1.0 0.8 97 1.2 1.1 1,195
Compensation -1 0.9 0.8 97 1.3 1.0 1,203
(Salary + Bonus) 0 0.7 0.6 97 1.3 1.2 1,201
($ millions) +1 0.9 0.7 96 1.4 1.2 1,202
+2 1.0 0.7 96 1.5 1.3 1,201
+3 1.1 0.8 94 1.6 1.4 1,075
-3 1.9 3.6 97 1.2 2.4 1,203
BLKV = Black- -2 3.0 9.0 97 2.5 8.1 1,191
Scholes Value of -1 4.8 15.4 97 2.3 5.7 1,195
Option Grants 0 1.1 2.5 97 2.6 5.5 1,192
($ millions) +1 0.9 1.1 95 2.8 10.0 1,193
+2 1.1 1.8 95 2.8 6.6 1,193
+3 1.9 5.0 91 2.6 6.8 1,068
-3 0.2 0.8 97 0.1 0.5 1,203
RSTGRNT =  -2 0.1 0.8 97 0.2 1.0 1,195
Restricted Stock  -1 0.1 0.7 97 0.3 1.0 1,203
Grants Value  0 0.1 0.4 97 0.4 1.5 1,201
($ millions) +1 0.2 0.6 96 0.4 1.6 1,202
+2 0.2 0.6 96 0.4 1.5 1,201
+3 0.3 1.0 94 0.7 2.3 1,075
-3 3.2 4.9 97 2.7 3.1 1,203
TDC1 = Total Direct -2 4.4 9.8 97 4.3 8.9 1,191
Compensation 1 -1 6.3 17.2 97 4.3 6.7 1,195
(TCC + BLKV + 0 2.4 3.5 97 4.7 7.0 1,192
RSTGRNT + Others) +1 2.3 2.5 95 5.1 11.0 1,193
($ millions) +2 2.6 3.1 95 5.2 8.2 1,193
+3 3.9 6.4 91 5.6 9.6 1,068
-3 1.1 4.2 96 1.4 5.9 1,190
EXER = Value  -2 5.5 18.5 97 1.8 6.6 1,194
Realized from  -1 2.7 14.7 97 1.8 6.6 1,202
Options Exercises 0 0.1 0.3 97 1.6 5.8 1,197
($ millions) +1 0.1 0.3 96 1.9 8.4 1,201
+2 0.4 1.5 95 1.8 6.6 1,199
+3 0.3 1.3 93 2.7 10.7 1,072
-3 2.6 4.8 97 2.8 6.4 1,203
TDC2 = Total Direct -2 7.2 19.8 97 3.6 7.8 1,195
Compensation 2 -1 4.3 16.7 97 3.8 7.4 1,203
(TCC + EXER + 0 1.2 1.6 97 3.7 6.8 1,201
RSTGRNT + Others) +1 1.6 1.9 96 4.2 9.4 1,202
($ millions) +2 2.0 2.7 96 4.3 8.0 1,201
+3 2.2 3.1 94 5.7 13.5 1,075
Potential  Controls TreatedTable 4. Balancing of covariates used in matching 
Variable Within Matches Diff.
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Fiscal Year 1995 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
Fiscal Year 1996 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 1997 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 1998 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.25 0.08* 0.04 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 1999 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
Fiscal Year 2000 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00
Fiscal Year 2001 0.15 0.36 0.31 0.46 -0.16** 0.04 0.00 0.01
Fiscal Year 2002 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.02
Dummy SIC = 1 - Consumer Industries/Services 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.44 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01
Dummy SIC = 2 - Manufacturing, Energy & Utilities 0.23 0.42 0.34 0.47 -0.11* 0.04 0.00 0.01
Dummy SIC = 3 - Business Equipment, Telecomm, TV 0.34 0.48 0.22 0.41 0.12* 0.05 0.02 0.02
Dummy SIC = 4 - Healthcare, Medical Equp & Drugs 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
Dummy SIC = 5 - Other Industries 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
Log of Market Capitalization in t=-3 6.99 1.39 7.24 1.44 -0.25 0.15 -0.22** 0.08
Dummy Large Market Cap (70th percentile) in t=-3 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.48 -0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.03
Total Liabilities/Total Assets in t = -3 0.48 0.24 0.49 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
O-Score in t=-3 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.06** 0.02 0.03** 0.01
Cumulutive Stock Return in t = [-3, -5] 0.48 1.07 0.24 0.51 0.24* 0.11 0.04 0.02
Dummy Top Quantile O-Score Distribution in t=-3 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.15 0.07* 0.03 0.00 0.00
Dummy Bottom Quantile Cum Stock Return  Dist in t=-3 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Total Current Compensation (TCC) ($m) in t = -3 1.01 1.07 1.09 0.76 -0.08 0.11 -0.06 0.05
Total Direct Compensation 1 (TDC1) ($m)  in t = -3 3.56 6.47 2.75 3.28 0.81 0.66 0.41 0.33
Number of Observations
Note:  The number of observations of the within matches difference, reflects that 4 matches where selected for each treated firm.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
99 1,205 396
Treated Pot. Controls Raw Difference
─Table 5. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of financial distress
             Outcome variables in differences with respect to their values in period -3
A. Simple Matching Estimator
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
-2  0.0    -0.1    -0.1     0.3    -0.3*    0.2     2.9*    3.4**   0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.2)   (1.0)   (1.6)   (1.6)   (0.0)  
-1 0.0    -0.3*** -0.3***  1.1    -0.2**   0.6     2.2     1.6     0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (1.7)   (0.1)   (1.8)   (1.9)   (1.6)   (0.0)  
0 -0.1*** -0.5*** -0.5*** -2.3*** -0.3*** -3.3*** -0.4    -1.7*   0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.4)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (1.2)   (1.0)   (0.0)  
+1 -0.1*** -0.4*** -0.4*** -4.2*** -0.1    -5.3*** -0.7    -2.0**   0.1*  
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.1)   (1.0)   (1.2)   (0.9)   (0.0)  
+2 -0.1*** -0.3*** -0.4*** -3.3*** -0.2*   -4.0*** -0.1    -1.1    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (1.2)   (1.3)   (0.0)  
+3 -0.1*** -0.2*** -0.3*** -1.3*   -0.5**  -2.1**  -1.3    -2.8*    0.1** 
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (0.2)   (0.9)   (1.3)   (1.4)   (0.0)  
B. Bias-Corrected Matching Estimator
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
-2  0.0    -0.1    -0.1     0.5    -0.2     0.4     2.9*    3.1*    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.2)   (1.0)   (1.6)   (1.6)   (0.0)  
-1 0.0    -0.3*** -0.3***  1.0    -0.2**   0.6     1.2     0.6     0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (1.7)   (0.1)   (1.8)   (1.9)   (1.6)   (0.0)  
0 -0.1*** -0.5*** -0.5*** -2.3*** -0.2**  -3.2*** -1.6    -2.6**  0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.4)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (1.2)   (1.0)   (0.0)  
+1 -0.1*** -0.4*** -0.4*** -5.0*** -0.1    -5.8*** -2.0*   -3.1***  0.1** 
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.1)   (1.0)   (1.2)   (0.9)   (0.0)  
+2 -0.1*** -0.3*** -0.4*** -2.7*** -0.2*   -3.5*** -0.5    -1.8    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (1.2)   (1.3)   (0.0)  
+3 -0.1*** -0.2*** -0.3*** -0.7    -0.5**  -1.3    -2.4*   -3.6**   0.1** 
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (0.2)   (0.9)   (1.3)   (1.4)   (0.0)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%
All variables are expressed in $ millions, except for OPGRNT
TCC           = Total Current Compensation (Salary + Bonus)
BLKV         =  Black-Scholes Value of Option Grants
RSTGRNT = Restricted Stock Grants Value 
TDC1        = Total Direct Compensation 1 (TCC + BLKV + RSTGRNT + Others)
EXER        = Value Realized from Option Exercises
TDC2        = Total Direct Compensation 2 (TCC + EXER + RSTGRNT + Others)
OPGRNT  = Log(Option Shares Granted / Total Shares Outstanding)Table 6. ATT of financial distress on turnover rates
              Bias-Corrected Matching Estimator
A. Turnover rates by several years periods
Period [-1,+1] [-1,+2] [-1,+3] [-2,+2] [-2,+3] [-3,+3]
ATT  0.20***  0.26***  0.29***  0.23***  0.22***  0.22***
S.E. (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)  
B. Turnover rates period-by-period
Period -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
ATT -0.01     0.06    -0.02     0.23***  0.08**   0.07*  
S.E. (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.04)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%Table 7. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of financial distress - By CEO Turnover 
             Outcome variables in differences with respect to their values in period -3
             Bias-Corrected Matching Estimator
A. Firms w/No CEO Turnover in [-3,+3]
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
-2  0.0    -0.2**  -0.1     0.1    0.0     0.0     0.5     1.1     0.2***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.0)   (1.1)   (0.6)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
-1  0.0    -0.4*** -0.3*** -1.8*** 0.0    -2.0*** -0.3    -0.7     0.3***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.0)   (0.7)   (0.3)   (0.4)   (0.1)  
0 -0.1**  -0.4*** -0.4*** -1.6*** -0.2**  -1.9*** -1.0    -2.9     0.5***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (1.9)   (1.9)   (0.1)  
+1 -0.1*** -0.4*** -0.5*** -3.0*** -0.1    -3.2*** -3.4*** -3.8***  0.1*  
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.1)   (0.7)   (0.9)   (1.0)   (0.1)  
+2 -0.1*** -0.3**  -0.4*** -2.5*** -0.1    -2.7*** -2.0*   -1.6    -0.1   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.1)   (1.0)   (1.2)   (1.2)   (0.1)  
+3 -0.1*** -0.2*   -0.4**  -1.1**  -0.1    -0.8    -0.1     0.3     0.2** 
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.2)   (0.8)   (1.8)   (1.9)   (0.1)  
B. Firms w/ CEO Turnover only in [-1,+1]
Period Salary Bonus TCC BLKV RSTGRNT TDC1 EXER TDC2 OPGRNT
-2  0.0    -0.2*** -0.2*** -0.9    0.0    -1.3    -0.1    -0.3    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.0)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.1)   (0.8)   (0.7)   (0.7)   (0.1)  
-1  0.0    -0.2*** -0.2*    5.1*** 0.0     4.9*   -0.2    -0.3     0.1   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (2.0)   (0.1)   (2.8)   (0.4)   (0.6)   (0.1)  
0 -0.1**  -0.3*** -0.4*** -1.0**  0.0    -1.5**  -0.1    -0.7     0.3***
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.6)   (0.6)   (0.1)  
+1  0.0    -0.1    -0.1    -2.6*** -0.2    -2.9***  0.2     0.1    -0.1   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (1.0)   (0.2)   (1.1)   (0.8)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
+2  0.0    -0.2*   -0.2**  -1.7***  0.1    -1.2**   0.3     0.4    0.0   
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.5)   (0.7)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
+3 0.0    -0.2    -0.2    -1.5**   0.1    -2.3*** -0.7    -1.2    -0.1*  
(0.0)   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.1)   (0.6)   (0.7)   (0.8)   (0.1)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%
All variables are expressed in $ millions, except for OPGRNT
TCC           = Total Current Compensation (Salary + Bonus)
BLKV         =  Black-Scholes Value of Option Grants
RSTGRNT = Restricted Stock Grants Value 
TDC1        = Total Direct Compensation 1 (TCC + BLKV + RSTGRNT + Others)
EXER        = Value Realized from Option Exercises
TDC2        = Total Direct Compensation 2 (TCC + EXER + RSTGRNT + Others)
OPGRNT  = Log(Option Shares Granted / Total Shares Outstanding)Table 8. Descriptive statistics for proportions of lucky grants: Before and after SOX
Period
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
-3 15.1 34.8 99 13.6 33.5 1,205 11.0 34.5 99 9.3 32.7 1,195
-2 19.0 37.6 99 14.3 34.1 1,200 14.4 37.1 99 10.1 33.7 1,200
-1 9.2 28.0 99 12.5 32.0 1,200 4.8 27.5 99 8.3 31.4 1,198
0 7.9 26.6 94 11.5 30.8 1,174 3.5 25.7 94 7.2 30.4 1,174
+1 9.4 28.2 80 11.8 31.4 1,012 4.2 29.0 80 7.5 31.0 1,012
+2 10.4 28.9 62 11.3 30.4 688 5.7 26.9 62 7.1 30.1 688
+3 5.2 21.1 52 12.4 32.0 494 0.9 20.9 52 8.2 31.6 494
+2 2.9 16.9 35 4.7 20.6 521 -0.5 16.8 35 0.9 20.5 521
+3 7.4 24.1 41 8.5 27.3 586 3.6 24.0 41 5.1 26.8 586
% of lucky grants (options granted with the grant prices below or at the lowest price within the grant month)






Treated Potential  Controls
Net (Controlling for number of trading days)Table 9. Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) of financial distress
               Proportions of lucky grants (only for grants before passage of SOX)
               Bias-Corrected Matching Estimator
A. Variables in Levels
% of lucky grants
Period Raw Net
-2  1.6     1.3   
(4.3)   (4.3)  
-1 -5.5    -5.7   
(3.8)   (3.6)  
0 -6.5*   -7.2** 
(3.3)   (3.1)  
+1 -8.7** -8.9** 
(4.0)   (3.8)  
+2 -4.5    -4.6   
(3.9)   (3.6)  
+3 -4.4    -5.9   
(4.3)   (4.4)  
B. Variables in differences with respect to their values in period -3
% of lucky grants
Period Raw Net
-2  8.3     6.0   
(5.7)   (5.6)  
-1 -0.3    -0.8   
(5.6)   (5.5)  
0 -2.9    -3.5   
(5.2)   (5.3)  
+1 -3.5    -5.1   
(6.0)   (5.8)  
+2  2.6     2.2   
(5.5)   (5.2)  
+3 -5.2    -6.7   
(6.4)   (6.4)  
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%*; *** significant at 1%